credo-journal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a process for recording research ideas, predictions, and hindsight which are stored in a markdown file and later retrieved during a 'Monthly Review'. This pattern creates a surface where data provided by a user (or external sources) could influence agent behavior when read back into the context.
- Ingestion points: User input for titles and fields are passed to the
appendfunction inscripts/journal.pyand written to the journal file. - Boundary markers: Entries are delimited by dated headers (e.g.,
## YYYY-MM-DD kind: title). However, the script does not escape or sanitize field values, which could allow the introduction of markdown structures or agent instructions within the file. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write capabilities via
scripts/journal.pyand the ability to execute the journal script through a test runner inscripts/test_journal.py. - Sanitization: The script validates that titles do not contain newlines, but it does not perform similar checks or escaping on the values passed to the
--fieldarguments, allowing for multi-line content to be injected into the journal file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/test_journal.pyfile utilizessubprocess.runto execute the bundledjournal.pyscript. This is performed within a test context to verify append-only behavior, but it represents the spawning of external processes from within the skill's script directory.
Audit Metadata