docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pywrites a C source string to a temporary file and compiles it at runtime usinggccinto a shared object (.so). - It then uses the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this library into thesofficeprocess to shim AF_UNIX socket behavior. - This technique is used to bypass sandbox restrictions but represents a high-risk dynamic execution pattern.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted
.docxfiles by unpacking them into XML for the agent to read and edit. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via
scripts/office/unpack.pywhich extracts XML from user-provided documents. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within the document XML during the editing process.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including shell execution (
soffice,gcc,gitviasubprocess.run) and file system write access. - Sanitization: The skill correctly uses
defusedxmlfor XML parsing, which mitigates technical XML attacks like XXE, but does not sanitize the semantic content against prompt injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple external shell commands via
subprocess.runacross several scripts: scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccfor compilation andsofficefor document conversion.scripts/accept_changes.pyexecutessofficeto run macros.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto validate changes.
Audit Metadata