inline-widget
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to generate and render HTML/JS widgets which may process untrusted data from conversation history or local files.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the widget via the
htmlstring parameter and thedata_filesparameter in theShowWidgettool call. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instruction-isolation warnings are required for the agent when interpolating data into the HTML structure.
- Capability inventory: The widget has access to the
sendPrompt()function to trigger follow-up agent actions and can read local sandbox files viawindow.__WIDGET_DATA__. - Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for sanitizing or escaping user-controlled data before it is rendered, creating a cross-site scripting (XSS) surface within the sandboxed iframe.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the use of external JavaScript libraries from well-known content delivery networks.
- Evidence: Instructions explicitly permit and provide examples for loading resources from
cdnjs.cloudflare.com,cdn.jsdelivr.net,unpkg.com, andesm.sh(e.g., loadingchart.jsfrom JSDelivr). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily designed for the dynamic generation and execution of code at runtime.
- Evidence: The
ShowWidgettool executes arbitrary HTML and JavaScript fragments generated by the agent, including<script>tags for interactivity and UI logic. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a mechanism for the widget to send information back to the agent, which could be abused if the widget logic is compromised.
- Evidence: The
sendPrompt('text')global function allows the widget to programmatically trigger chat messages, which could be used to exfiltrate data retrieved from thewindow.__WIDGET_DATA__object.
Audit Metadata