prompt-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from past AI conversations (the
messagesfield inprompts.db) which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The agent retrieves conversation content via the
git-ai prompts nextcommand inSKILL.md, which returns JSON containing human prompts and AI responses. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions lack robust delimiters or specific instructions to ignore commands embedded within the analyzed conversation data when passing it to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The agent and its subagents have access to
Bash(git-ai:*)and theTasktool, which can be used to modify the database or spawn further actions based on injected instructions. - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation of the conversation content is described before it is processed by the AI.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands via the
git-aitool to manage and query its local database. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains numerous examples ofgit-ai prompts execbeing used to performALTER TABLE,UPDATE, and complexSELECToperations. - Evidence: The skill uses the
Tasktool to dynamically spawn subagents with instruction sets generated at runtime.
Audit Metadata