create-plan-by

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to invoke external CLI tools using flags designed to bypass security protocols and user confirmation. Specifically, it specifies the use of --dangerously-skip-permissions for the claude (Claude Code) tool and --yolo for the agent (Cursor) tool. These flags suppress safety prompts and human-in-the-loop verification, which is a high-risk autonomy abuse pattern.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the AI to search the user's terminal configuration files for command aliases and execute them if a specific sub-agent is not found. This introduces a risk where the agent might execute unverified or malicious local commands without proper validation of the alias's actual function.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data (plans generated by external sub-agents) and processes this content to synthesize a revised plan. The instructions lack boundary markers (delimiters) or sanitization logic to ensure that instructions embedded within a sub-agent's generated plan do not override the primary agent's logic during the synthesis phase.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 04:46 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — create-plan-by