recall
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
recall.mjsreads~/.config/fast-ship/config.yamlto extract anapi_keyfor the Fast Ship service. While this is used for authenticated API calls, it involves accessing hardcoded secrets in a local configuration file.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill collects sensitive information including local worktree paths, branch names, and full conversation history from~/.t3/userdata/statev2.sqlite. This data is subsequently passed to the agent and used to make network requests to the Fast Ship API endpoint specified in the user's configuration.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes several local CLI tools usingexecFileSync, includinggitfor repository status,ghfor GitHub PR details, andsqlite3as a fallback for database queries.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to how it processes external data.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context from Git logs, GitHub PR titles/bodies, and T3 thread message payloads via
scripts/recall.mjs.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read local files, execute shell commands (
git,gh,sqlite3), and perform network operations (fetch).\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested content beyond simple string truncation for length.
Audit Metadata