skill-linker
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/install.shutilizessudoto invoke system package managers (apt-get,dnf,pacman) for installing thefzfutility if it is not already present on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation script modifies several user shell profile files, including
.bashrc,.zshrc, and.bash_profile, to export theSKILL_LINK_ROOTenvironment variable and append~/.local/binto thePATH. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core utility
scripts/skill-link.shperforms file system manipulations by creating and removing symbolic links within configuration directories for editors such as Cursor, Claude Code, and Codex. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by reading and displaying arbitrary file names from a user-defined directory to the agent.
- Ingestion points: The
collect_itemsfunction inscripts/skill-link.shretrieves a list of directory and file names from the path stored inSKILL_LINK_ROOT. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or security warnings are provided in the instructions to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious file names.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system modification capabilities (creating symbolic links) and can trigger script installations.
- Sanitization: There is no validation or filtering performed on the file names retrieved from the source directory before they are displayed or used in link operations.
Audit Metadata