migration-core

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external CI/CD configuration files (e.g., Jenkinsfile, GitLab-CI) which could potentially contain adversarial instructions targeting the conversion process. * Ingestion points: The workflow explicitly requires source files from the user in Phase 1. * Boundary markers: Instructions strictly mandate converting 'only' what is in the source and prohibit inventing workflows from descriptions. * Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write to the repository filesystem, create Pull Requests, and execute the actionlint tool. * Sanitization: The process requires validation of all generated YAML using actionlint and mandates pinning external actions to specific commit SHAs for integrity.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs the actionlint utility to validate generated workflows. It also references and utilizes GitHub Marketplace actions from verified providers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs localized filesystem operations to archive legacy CI/CD files, including directory creation (mkdir) and moving or deleting original configuration files during the migration process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 19, 2026, 06:47 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — migration-core