migration-core
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external CI/CD configuration files (e.g., Jenkinsfile, GitLab-CI) which could potentially contain adversarial instructions targeting the conversion process. * Ingestion points: The workflow explicitly requires source files from the user in Phase 1. * Boundary markers: Instructions strictly mandate converting 'only' what is in the source and prohibit inventing workflows from descriptions. * Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write to the repository filesystem, create Pull Requests, and execute the
actionlinttool. * Sanitization: The process requires validation of all generated YAML usingactionlintand mandates pinning external actions to specific commit SHAs for integrity. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs the
actionlintutility to validate generated workflows. It also references and utilizes GitHub Marketplace actions from verified providers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs localized filesystem operations to archive legacy CI/CD files, including directory creation (
mkdir) and moving or deleting original configuration files during the migration process.
Audit Metadata