acquire-codebase-knowledge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the local codebase (e.g., README files, PRDs, and source code) to populate its documentation templates. This presents a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in project files could attempt to influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdPhase 1 and Phase 2 require the agent to read various documentation and source files;scripts/scan.pyreads manifest files and searches for TODO/FIXME comments across the repository. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill relies on the agent's instructions to trace claims to source files and terminal output rather than using technical delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write files to the local
docs/codebase/directory and execute the bundledscripts/scan.pyscript. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or instruction-filtering is applied to the content read from the codebase.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled Python script and standard git commands to perform repository discovery and metrics collection.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdPhase 1 instructs the agent to runpython3 "$SKILL_ROOT/scripts/scan.py". The script itself utilizessubprocess.run()to executegit logandgit rev-parse. These commands are used for local reconnaissance (e.g., detecting high-churn files and recent commits) and do not involve network operations or arbitrary shell execution.
Audit Metadata