conventional-commit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include a specific directive to bypass user confirmation for terminal commands, which attempts to override standard agent safety guardrails.
- Evidence: The phrase "no confirmation needed" in Step 5 of the workflow description in SKILL.md.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the execution of multiple shell commands to perform its primary function.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run
git status,git diff,git add, andgit commitin the user's terminal. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local repository changes that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the final commit message.
- Ingestion points:
git diffandgit diff --cachedoutput is analyzed by the agent as part of the workflow in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat content within the diff as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to execute
git commit, allowing it to modify the repository history. - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is encouraged to construct messages based directly on content found in the diff.
Audit Metadata