conventional-commit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include a specific directive to bypass user confirmation for terminal commands, which attempts to override standard agent safety guardrails.
  • Evidence: The phrase "no confirmation needed" in Step 5 of the workflow description in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the execution of multiple shell commands to perform its primary function.
  • Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run git status, git diff, git add, and git commit in the user's terminal.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local repository changes that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the final commit message.
  • Ingestion points: git diff and git diff --cached output is analyzed by the agent as part of the workflow in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat content within the diff as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to execute git commit, allowing it to modify the repository history.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The agent is encouraged to construct messages based directly on content found in the diff.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 05:34 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — conventional-commit