eval-driven-dev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
resources/setup.shscript executes a self-update command usingnpx skills updatefrom a remote repository (github/awesome-copilot). While this repository belongs to the author's namespace, it represents a mechanism for executing remote code updates. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
setup.shscript performs automated installations of thepixie-qapackage from public registries (pip,uv,poetry). The metadata identifies the source as a non-trusted third-party repository (github.com/yiouli/pixie-qa). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute a shell script (
resources/setup.sh) that manages environment initialization, package management, and background service operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Step 1) direct the agent to ingest and prioritize external, user-specified files such asEVAL_SPEC.mdorREQUIREMENTS.mdto define its workflow. - Ingestion points: The agent reads user-provided documentation, specification files, and the application's own source code to determine capabilities and criteria.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when reading these external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including script execution, package installation, and modifying project files.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the ingested specification files before the agent adopts their instructions.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
setup.shscript starts a background web server process viapixie start. The skill instructions explicitly note that this process remains active across sessions and must be manually terminated by the user, representing a functional persistence mechanism.
Audit Metadata