phoenix-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted LLM trace and span data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
px trace getandpx span listretrieveinput.valueandoutput.valueattributes from external traces (identified inSKILL.mdandreferences/open-coding.md).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or guardrail prompts to distinguish untrusted trace content from system instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, perform network operations via the Phoenix CLI, and write to local sidecar files in
.px/coding/.\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the trace data is described before it is used for note-taking and taxonomy creation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to interface with the Phoenix CLI and process data with tools like
jq.\n - Evidence: Multiple command examples are provided throughout the skill files, including complex pipelines involving
pxandjq.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizesnpxto fetch and execute external code from the NPM registry.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies the use ofnpx @arizeai/phoenix-clifor running the debugger.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and packages from remote sources.\n - Evidence: The use of
npxto download the CLI and thepx docs fetchcommand to download documentation markdown files.
Audit Metadata