roundup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill systematically reads and processes data from external, attacker-controlled environments (GitHub pull requests/issues, M365 emails, Slack messages, Google Workspace). If an external source contains malicious instructions (e.g., inside an email or a GitHub issue comment), it can pollute the agent context.
- Ingestion points: Processes data from GitHub (
list_pull_requests,search_pull_requests), Slack channels, M365 (ask_work_iq), and Google Workspace (Gmail, Drive, Calendar). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement or mandate strict boundary delimiters or instructions to ignore nested prompt overrides in the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: File reading (
~/.config/roundup/config.md), file writing (~/Desktop/roundup-*.md), and interactive tool execution across multiple collaboration platforms. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping mechanisms are specified for the aggregated external texts before they are processed during synthesis.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instruction references local file management capabilities, instructing the agent to read config files and write markdown summaries directly to the file system (
~/Desktop).
Audit Metadata