setup-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external public URLs and local repository files to generate documentation drafts.
- Ingestion points: Processes data from public HTTPS documentation URLs, local repository manifests, scripts, and documentation files as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/source-workflow.md. - Boundary markers: Employs independent sub-agents to isolate research tasks. Instructions in
references/deriving-context.mdexplicitly mandate treating source content as evidence, not as instructions to execute or expand scope. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to read local files, execute read-only CLI commands, call MCP tools, and write files to the repository.
- Sanitization: Implements a 'CLI access contract' in
references/source-workflow.mdthat uses a runtime allowlist and subprocess argument vectors to prevent command injection from retrieved data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of design-system CLI tools and package managers.
- Evidence:
references/source-workflow.mdoutlines the 'Design-system CLI access' contract, allowing execution of user-named, already installed executables. - Security controls: All invocations are required to use a non-shell subprocess interface with shell evaluation disabled. It explicitly rejects shell metacharacters and expansions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill can download and install packages and browser-related tooling.
- Evidence:
references/browser-tooling.mddetails the process for installing user-named packages and browser drivers like Playwright. - Security controls: Every installation requires explicit user approval, providing the exact package, version, and command before execution. It enforces the use of the repository's existing package manager.
Audit Metadata