postiz
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data provided by the user (or potential external sources if the agent fetches content) to create social media posts, creating a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Content passed via the
-c/--contentflag or JSON structure to thepostiz posts:createcommand. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly provide specific delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data being interpolated into the shell commands.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
Bash(postiz:*), file system read/write for credentials, and network operations toapi.postiz.com,mcp.postiz.com, andcli-auth.postiz.com. - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly describe sanitization of the content before it is passed to the CLI tool.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages and accesses a sensitive configuration file on the local file system.
- Evidence: The file
~/.postiz/credentials.jsonis used to store OAuth access tokens and API settings, as seen insrc/commands/auth.ts. While necessary for the tool's primary purpose, agents must be careful not to expose the contents of this file or thePOSTIZ_API_KEYenvironment variable in logs or output.
Audit Metadata