skills/gitroomhq/postiz-docs/postiz/Gen Agent Trust Hub

postiz

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/sync-facts.mjs uses the eval() function to parse a data structure from a source file in a separate repository. This is used to synchronize pricing and limits data between the application code and the documentation.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The utility script scripts/screenshots/capture.mjs contains hardcoded credentials (EMAIL = 'demo@acme.test' and PASSWORD = 'DocsDemo!2345'). While these are intended for a local demo instance used to generate documentation screenshots, hardcoding credentials in repository scripts is an unsafe practice.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides automated features that ingest untrusted data from external sources, creating a significant vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through RSS feeds (general/automations/auto-post-rss.mdx) and YouTube video transcripts or captions processed for the clipping feature (general/clipping.mdx).
  • Boundary markers: Explicit warnings are present in the documentation (public-api/clipping/get.mdx) and MCP tool schemas (mcp/tools.mdx), instructing the agent to treat ingested text (such as clip titles and post text) as content for the user and never as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to schedule and publish posts (schedulePostTool in mcp/tools.mdx) and perform network operations via the Postiz API.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of automated sanitization, filtering, or escaping of external content is described before the data is interpolated into the agent's context or drafted for social media posts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 01:37 PM