gemini

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the Bash tool by interpolating prompts into a command string (e.g., gemini -p "<english-prompt>"). This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the prompt contains shell metacharacters like double quotes or semicolons that are not properly escaped.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the gemini CLI tool which supports high-risk modes such as --approval-mode auto_edit and --yolo. While the instructions state these should only be used with explicit user consent, they represent a mechanism for the external tool to dynamically modify the local environment or execute actions based on AI output.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the analysis of external, potentially untrusted data such as code repositories and documentation by passing them to an external Gemini model.
  • Ingestion points: Data from the current project or codebase is read and included in prompts sent to the CLI tool (Step 2 in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill includes instructions to treat results as untrusted and to seek user confirmation before execution, providing a manual check but no technical isolation or delimiters for ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash, Read, and Write tools.
  • Sanitization: There are no documented steps for sanitizing external data or escaping shell metacharacters before it is interpolated into the CLI prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 09:08 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gemini