skills/giuseppe-trisciuoglio/developer-kit/langchain4j-rag-implementation-patterns/Gen Agent Trust Hub
langchain4j-rag-implementation-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements patterns for ingesting untrusted data from the filesystem and external URLs into the agent's context window. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in processed documents could influence the agent's behavior during RAG tasks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
FileSystemDocumentLoaderinSKILL.mdandreferences/examples.md, and viaUrlDocumentLoaderinreferences/references.md. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses
@SystemMessageto define the assistant's role, it lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions for the model to ignore potential commands embedded within the retrieved context segments. - Capability inventory: The skill is configured to allow
Read,Write, andBashtools, granting significant system interaction capability if the agent is manipulated. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of text sanitization, filtering, or input validation performed on the ingested document content before it is passed to the language model.
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