gjalla-onboard

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses multiple shell commands to check for, install, and run the gjalla CLI, as well as to search for repository paths and session transcripts.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installs the 'gjalla' package from public registries using pipx or uv.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill extracts and uploads project metadata and content to the vendor's infrastructure at gjalla.io.
  • Session Metadata: Step 5 extracts commit SHAs, branch names, and commit subjects from git logs and session transcripts located in ~/.claude/projects/ and ~/.codex/sessions/.
  • Project Memory: Step 7 gathers 'facts' from project documentation (CLAUDE.md, README.md, etc.) and git history, uploading them to the shared memory service.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from git logs and project documentation, which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Reads from git logs via git log and git show, session transcripts in the user's home directory, and various markdown files within the project.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters to encapsulate the data being parsed or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution and network operations via the gjalla CLI.
  • Sanitization: While the skill filters for secrets and specific headers, it does not sanitize the content to prevent command injection or prompt injection during the data gathering steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 07:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gjalla-onboard