gjalla-onboard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
gjallacommand-line tool from a public registry usingpipx installoruv tool installas part of the onboarding process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute several shell commands, including environment detection (
command -v), package installation, and multiple tool-specific commands (gjalla setup,gjalla auth,gjalla sync,gjalla memory) to manage the platform's state. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to collect and upload data to the
gjalla.ioservice. This includes reading session transcripts from internal agent directories (~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions/) and extracting commit history and project documentation. While the skill instructs the agent to filter out secrets and personal data, it represents a structured mechanism for sending local agent history to a remote service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it requires the agent to read and process content from potentially untrusted project files and command outputs.
- Ingestion points: Reads data from
README.md,CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,git logoutput, and files within~/.claude/projects/or~/.codex/sessions/. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" delimiters are used when processing these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: Uses
gjalla memory addandgjalla attest addto transmit extracted information to a network endpoint, andgjalla setupto modify local configuration files. - Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions for the agent to manually identify and exclude secrets or personal information; it does not implement programmatic sanitization or validation of the ingested content.
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