ingest-new-instagram-recipes
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several shell operations to manage files and retrieve system information.
- In
workflow.js, the agent is instructed to runsecurity find-generic-password -s imgur-api -wto retrieve stored credentials. - In
new_shortcodes.py, thesubprocess.runfunction is used to executerg(ripgrep) for searching the contents of the local Obsidian vault. - In
workflow.js,git addandgit commitcommands are utilized to manage version control for the vault repository. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill programmatically accesses the system's secure storage to retrieve API secrets.
workflow.jsexplicitly directs the agent to fetch the Imgur Client ID from the macOS Keychain service named "imgur-api".- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Local image files are transmitted to an external third-party service.
workflow.jsfacilitates the upload of local thumbnail images (_thumb.jpg) from the user's disk to the Imgur API (api.imgur.com) or via a browser-based upload session.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content (Instagram captions) which could be used to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Instagram captions and metadata are read from a local SQLite database (
urls.db) and subsequently passed to other processing agents. - Boundary markers: None are present to delimit untrusted caption text from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including system keychain access, file system write permissions, and network access.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the caption content before it is processed by the cleaning agent.
Audit Metadata