youtube-ingest
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with
yt-dlpandgit. Passing the user-provided<youtube_url>directly into a shell command string (uvx yt-dlp --get-title "<youtube_url>") creates a risk of command injection if the input is not sanitized by the platform.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains a hardcoded absolute path to a specific user's directory:/Users/mtm/Documents/Obsidian Vault/. Using absolute paths with specific usernames exposes local system details and limits the skill's portability and security.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow relies on external, untrusted metadata from YouTube to generate filenames, commit messages, and note content, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Video titles and summaries fetched via
yt-dlpandWebFetchinSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit markers or instructions to the agent to treat fetched metadata as untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (
yt-dlp,git), local filesystem writes, and interaction with thesocial-to-imgurskill.\n - Sanitization: While Step 3 provides some character stripping for filenames, the summary and title are used in git commits and note bodies without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata