sentry-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from an external source (Sentry) to drive code modifications.
- Ingestion points: Sentry issue summaries, descriptions, and stack traces retrieved via
mcp__sentry__get_sentry_resourceinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not explicitly tell the agent to ignore or delimit instructions that might be embedded within the Sentry error data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read/edit the entire local codebase, execute shell commands for project quality gates (e.g., PHPStan, Pint), and perform Git commits.
- Sanitization: Absent. The skill processes external tool outputs directly without validation or filtering for potential injection strings.
- Mitigation: The skill implements a robust mitigation in step 4d ('Propose fix — wait for approval'), which forbids any code modification or command execution for fixes until the user has explicitly reviewed and approved the proposed diff.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs command execution as part of its verification workflow.
- In step 4e, the agent is instructed to run the project's quality gates such as
PHPStan,Pint, ortests. - While these are standard development tools, they are executed based on the context of the fix being implemented, which could be influenced by the aforementioned indirect injection.
Audit Metadata