cull
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process data from external image files and folders.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
import_folderandimport_files(SKILL.md) bring external file metadata and content into the agent's processing context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not direct the agent to treat imported data as untrusted or to use specific delimiters when processing file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for file-system writes (
export_images), execution of thecullbinary, and interactive curation through various MCP tools. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitizing or validating image metadata or content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata