google-image-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
llmCLI tool viasubprocess.runinscripts/llm_select.py. The implementation uses a list-based argument structure rather than a shell string, which effectively mitigates shell injection vulnerabilities while enabling intelligent selection and term extraction. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, presenting a theoretical injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from Google Search result metadata (titles and snippets) and local Markdown files (Obsidian notes) via
scripts/llm_select.pyandscripts/obsidian.py. - Boundary markers: The system prompts in
llm_select.pydefine strict JSON output formats and instructions, though they lack explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the interpolated external content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform network requests for image downloads (
urllib.request) and write to the local file system to update notes and save images. - Sanitization: Filenames are sanitized using a slugify function, and markdown alt-text is escaped to prevent formatting breakages.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages sensitive API keys for Google Search and OpenRouter. These are handled via
.envfile resolution inscripts/config.py, which is a standard and secure practice. Additionally, the skill's access to Obsidian vault settings (app.json) and note content is restricted to its primary purpose of media integration.
Audit Metadata