gpt-image-2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/gpt_image_2.pyinvokes several external command-line utilities viasubprocess.run. These include thesopstool for decrypting API credentials fromsecrets.enc.yamlfiles, thellmCLI for automated prompt validation, andmagick(ImageMagick) for performing image resizing and generating contact sheets. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a "Preflight" validation mechanism that is susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
promptargument passed toscripts/gpt_image_2.py(file:scripts/gpt_image_2.py). - Boundary markers: The validation query uses a
PROMPT:delimiter but does not include explicit instructions for the model to ignore embedded commands (file:scripts/gpt_image_2.py). - Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests, execute external commands, and perform file system writes (file:
scripts/gpt_image_2.py). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is applied to the user-supplied prompt before it is processed by the external validation model.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill establishes network connections to well-known service providers, including
api.openai.comandopenrouter.ai, to transmit image generation requests and receive binary data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script is configured to read from local files (
secrets.enc.yaml) to retrieve API keys using thesopsutility. These credentials are subsequently transmitted to the configured API providers in theAuthorizationheader of network requests.
Audit Metadata