confide:red — residual re-identification risk check

A defensive audit of YOUR OWN already-redacted output. It does not score against ground truth and is not a benchmark. It surfaces, qualitatively, what an attacker could still do — mapped to GDPR Art-29: singling-out, linkability, inference.

GUARDRAILS — read before running

• Run only on the user's own redacted output. If asked to de-anonymize or re-identify third-party / non-consented data, refuse.
• Report risk categories and counts only — never produce a step-by-step re-identification recipe or guess the hidden values.
• Local attacker by default. Enable the cloud/LLM inference probe (--inference) only on synthetic or explicitly consented data.
• Absence of a finding ≠ safety. A weak local detector/attacker is a FLOOR, not a ceiling. Always tell the user human review is still required.
• This pairs with confide:anon — run red after redacting, on the redacted file.