temple-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a bundled Python script (
extract_entities.py) via the command line to scan the user's Obsidian vault and extract metadata for the visualization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from the user's local files to classify entities and 'calibrate' the agent's tone for the generated temple text.
- Ingestion points: The
extract_entities.pyscript reads markdown files from a user-provided directory, and the agent is explicitly instructed inSKILL.mdStep 2 to read the content of central nodes. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or explicit 'ignore' instructions when reading the vault content.
- Capability inventory: The skill spawns a subprocess to execute the metadata extraction script and writes output files (JSON and HTML) to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested note content before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generated visualization (HTML) fetches Three.js and MediaPipe libraries from
cdn.jsdelivr.netandstorage.googleapis.comat runtime. These are well-known and established services. - [PERSISTENCE]: The generated HTML file utilizes browser
localStorageto persist interaction state, such as discovered nodes and unlocked 'secrets', between user sessions.
Audit Metadata