brand-illustrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
illustrate.pyscript dynamically locates and executes external image backend scripts (e.g.,gpt-image-2,nano-banana) on the local system.\n - The discovery logic in
probe_backendssearches for scripts using paths defined in environment variables likeHUMANE_IMAGE_BACKENDandHUMANE_SKILLS_DIR, as well as standard agent skill directories (e.g.,~/.claude/skills).\n - These scripts are then executed via
subprocess.run. This behavior is the central function of the adapter, but it relies on external code execution from paths that can be influenced by project or environment configuration.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates data from external JSON token files (design.tokens.json) directly into prompts for image generation and generated gallery metadata.\n - Ingestion points: The skill reads brand attributes (such as
moodandimageryStyle) and font names from user-supplied token files inillustrate.py.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to separate the external brand data from the rest of the generation prompt, making the downstream generator potentially susceptible to instructions embedded in these files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
subprocess.runto call generators and writes HTML files (gallery.html,contact-sheet.html) based on this data.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not sanitize or validate token file content before interpolation, which allows for potential XSS in generated HTML galleries if filenames or subjects contain malicious scripts.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes command-line strings to invoke local backend scripts.\n
- It uses
subprocess.runto call the interpreted Python scripts or binary executables discovered during its probing phase.
Audit Metadata