flow-next-spec-completion-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs
evalto execute output from the bundledflowctlscript, which can result in the execution of dynamically generated shell commands (e.g.,eval \"$($FLOWCTL rp setup-review ...)\"). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external LLM feedback to drive automated code modifications and git commits.
- Ingestion point:
workflow.mdreads reviewer responses via theREVIEW_RESPONSEvariable. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to ignore malicious directives within the feedback.
- Capability inventory: The skill has authority to run
git add,git commit, and file system modifications. - Sanitization: Absent; the workflow is designed to automatically apply all fixes suggested by the backend.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions command the agent to operate without user oversight or safety prompts: 'CRITICAL: Do NOT ask user for confirmation. Automatically fix ALL valid issues and re-review... Never use AskUserQuestion in this loop.'
Audit Metadata