bento-adversarial-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a series of complex shell commands for git operations, state management, and invoking external review tools (
codex,claude). It manages background processes and redirects output to files within the.gitdirectory for persistence across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (source code diffs and file contents) by passing it to another LLM for analysis, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters via the git diff scope command and subsequent reading of full file contents referenced in the diff.
- Boundary markers: Untrusted code is provided to the reviewer model via file paths or stdin; there are no explicit sanitization routines or delimiters to prevent embedded instructions in the source code from affecting the reviewer's output.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write files, execute shell commands, and create git commits.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on an "adversarial" persona for the reviewer and a mandatory Phase 2 manual triage by the agent/user to verify findings before any actions are taken.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions direct the agent to request escalated permissions (such as network access and filesystem writes to
~/.claude) if it detects it is running on a sandboxed host, which is necessary for the review tools to function.
Audit Metadata