accelint-eval-architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/tests/test_bootstrap_goldset.pyutilizesexec()andcompile()to dynamically execute Python code from a local asset template (assets/templates/rag/corpus_hash.py.template) during internal testing. This capability allows for the runtime execution of code strings. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Automation scripts such as
scripts/audit_checks.pyandscripts/scaffold_eval.pyexecute shell commands viasubprocess.run(). These are primarily used for Git operations (e.g.,git status,git init) to track and manage evaluation source files. While the arguments are passed in a structured format, shell command execution remains a sensitive capability. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests documentation and metadata (e.g.,
SKILL.md,README.md) from target repositories to generate eval profiles. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the target content contains malicious instructions. - Ingestion points: Reads files from the target directory including
SKILL.md,README.md, and package manifests. - Boundary markers: The assessment logic does not explicitly document the use of delimiters or sanitization for interpolated target data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file-write and system-command (Git) capabilities.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the ingested external content is described.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_EXFILTRATION]: Evaluation harness templates (
assets/templates/deepeval/.env.example) point to a remote vendor-owned proxy service atlitellm-ai.accelint.dev. While associated with the skill author, this configuration involves transmitting data to an external service for LLM judgment.
Audit Metadata