accelint-prompt-manager
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to facilitate a 'copy to clipboard' feature using OS-specific commands such aspbcopy,xclip, orclip. The content passed to these commands is the 'optimized prompt,' which is directly derived from untrusted user input. This creates a potential command injection vector if the agent interpolates the prompt into the shell command without proper escaping (e.g., if a prompt contains backticks or shell meta-characters). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to process untrusted data (user-supplied drafts) to provide optimization services, which establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted user data enters the agent context through the initial request and during the 'Intake & Assessment' phase (Step 1) in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement robust structural boundary markers (such as randomized XML tags or strict schema validation) to isolate user-provided text from the skill's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
Bash), write to the local file system (Write), and read local files (Read). - Sanitization: The instructions include behavioral guidance for the agent to 'consider injection attacks' and 'use delimiters,' but it lacks technical enforcement mechanisms to prevent malicious user-provided content from influencing the agent's behavior during the optimization process.
Audit Metadata