accelint-qrspi-archive

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from documentation files (such as design.md and spec.md) and interpolates it into other specifications and index files. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious text in the source files could influence the agent's behavior during the archiving process.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from openspec/changes/<slug>/design.md and openspec/specs/<capability>/spec.md (specifically Purpose headings).
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes and invokes internal tools like /opsx:archive.
  • Sanitization: No explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping the content read from these files were found.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not utilize specific delimiters to isolate untrusted project data during interpolation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to use command-line utilities for precise file modifications, such as locating specific rows in a markdown table. This introduces a potential surface for command injection if capability names are not strictly validated or escaped before being passed to the shell.
  • Evidence: Implementation step 25 instructs the agent to "grep for the line whose first cell exactly matches the capability name" when patching the INDEX.md file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 05:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — accelint-qrspi-archive