accelint-qrspi-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various CLI tools including
openspec config listto verify workspace configuration andwhich semfollowed bysem impact <token>for dependency analysis. It also usespython3to generate ISO 8601 timestamps for artifact metadata. These commands use static paths and well-defined arguments relevant to the skill's purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted ticket or feature request data which is then passed into prompt templates for sub-agents to generate research questions, design documents, and task plans. While the skill explicitly manages context isolation between phases, it lack explicit delimiters or sanitization for the untrusted input within sub-agent prompts. 1. Ingestion points: The initial ticket description provided by the user in
SKILL.mdStep 1. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; ticket content is interpolated into sub-agent prompts without unique delimiters or 'ignore' instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has access to subprocess execution (openspec,sem,python3), file-write and edit capabilities (WriteandEdittools), and sub-agent spawning (Agenttool) as seen inSKILL.mdSteps 10, 14, 25, and 37. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the raw ticket text is used to drive the workflow. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes short Python scripts via
python3 -cto generate timestamps for thetrace.mdanddesign.mdfiles inSKILL.mdSteps 25 and 31. These are based on fixed templates and do not incorporate untrusted input into the command string.
Audit Metadata