docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a process injection mechanism. It contains hardcoded C source code designed to shim system-level socket functions. At runtime, the script writes this source to disk, compiles it usinggcc, and then loads the resulting shared library into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute external binaries across multiple scripts: scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutes thegcccompiler to build the shared object for library injection.scripts/accept_changes.pyexecutessofficewith custom environment variables and macro injection to manipulate documents.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto perform content comparison.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted document data as XML, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyreads user-provided Word documents and extracts their XML content. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed XML.
- Capability inventory: Extensive, including runtime compilation (
gcc), document macro execution (soffice), and file system manipulation. - Sanitization: The skill uses
defusedxmlandlxmlfor parsing, which mitigates standard XML external entity (XXE) attacks, but the processed content still flows into sensitive logic paths.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata