membership-longest-subscribers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include directives aimed at influencing the agent's tool-selection behavior, attempting to prioritize this skill over standard tool usage or other available workflows.
- Evidence: "Use by default whenever the user wants... even indirectly or with approximate wording. Prefer this skill over raw MCP-tool handling when it reasonably fits. Skip only if the user explicitly asks not to use this skill/workflow."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and display data from external sources (membership databases), creating a surface where malicious payloads in that data could influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from the
classic_list_active_subscriptionsandclassic_list_expired_subscriptionstools (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the subscription data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to
READ_ONLYaccess and formatting data into markdown tables. It does not utilize capabilities for file system modification, network exfiltration, or code execution. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no instruction to sanitize, escape, or validate the content of retrieved PII fields such as names or emails before rendering them in the leaderboard tables.
Audit Metadata