agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
executefunction allows the agent to run JavaScript to extract sensitive information from the browser context, such as session cookies (document.cookie) and local storage data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
interactfunction includes anuploadaction that accepts afile_pathsarray, enabling the agent to select and upload files from the local file system to remote web servers. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a mechanism to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on any visited web page via the
executefunction. While a standard feature for browser automation, this allows for runtime code generation and execution within the browser environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data by design as it browses external websites. This exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection, where malicious content on a webpage could attempt to subvert the agent's instructions. The evidence chain for this includes:
- Ingestion points: The
openandgotoactions navigate to arbitrary URLs, and thesnapshotfunction retrieves the page's text content (referenced inSKILL.mdandreferences/snapshot-refs.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for webpage content were found in the skill definitions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
belt, perform network requests through the browser, and upload files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the HTML/text content retrieved from pages before it is presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with
allowed-tools: Bash(belt *)and relies on executing thebeltcommand-line utility for all browser interactions, including session management and page navigation.
Audit Metadata