ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides scripts that ingest untrusted data from command-line arguments and local files, interpolating them directly into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers. * Ingestion points:
conditional_workflow.sh(input argument$1) anddata_processing.sh(reading raw text files viacat). * Boundary markers: None present. Content is directly concatenated into prompt strings. * Capability inventory: The skill uses thebeltCLI to interact with external AI models andcurlfor network requests. * Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the ingested content before it is processed by the agent. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the installation of external components using
npx skills add, which fetches and integrates remote code from repositories likebelt-sh/cliandinference-sh/skills. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes shell scripts that utilize commands such as
cat,mkdir,npx, andcurl, which exceed the constraints specified in the frontmatter'sallowed-toolsfield (Bash(belt *)). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
monitored_workflow.shexample demonstrates a pattern for sending execution results and error data to an external, user-defined webhook viacurlPOST requests.
Audit Metadata