ai-image-generation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user to install the
belt-sh/clitool and references external installation scripts hosted athttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md. While GitHub is a common host, the specific source organization is not verified in the internal trust lists. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
Bashtool to execute thebeltCLI. The skill's configuration appropriately usesallowed-toolsto restrict the agent to only runningbeltcommands, which follows the principle of least privilege. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a capability to ingest untrusted data (user prompts and image URLs) which are passed to the
beltCLI. There are no explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps documented to prevent the agent from potentially following instructions embedded within those prompts. - Ingestion points: The
--inputJSON object, specifically thepromptandimage_urlfields inSKILL.mdexamples. - Boundary markers: Absent from the provided instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of the
beltCLI tool via theBashtool. - Sanitization: No evidence of input escaping or validation within the skill instructions.
Audit Metadata