content-repurposing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external data such as blog posts, podcast transcripts, and videos to generate derivative social media content. This functionality presents a risk of indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in the source material could be executed by the agent or influence its output.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions prompt the agent to read and "repurpose" long-form source content like blogs and transcripts provided in the context or via files (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to separate user-provided content from agent instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the source text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI tool to perform high-impact actions, including generating images, audio, video, and posting directly to social media platforms viabelt app run x/post-create(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering mechanisms are defined for the ingested external content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the installation of external CLI tools and additional skill packages from third-party repositories.
- Evidence: The documentation suggests installing the
belt-sh/cliand various other skills usingnpx skills addand provides links to external installation instructions hosted on GitHub athttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md(SKILL.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to perform its primary functions, including credential management and application execution.
- Evidence: Includes multiple bash examples such as
belt loginfor authentication andbelt app runfor interacting with remote AI models and social media APIs (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata