google-veo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of the
beltCLI tool vianpx skills add belt-sh/cliand links to documentation hosted on GitHub. These dependencies are necessary for the skill's primary function of interfacing with the inference.sh platform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
beltcommand-line utility for authentication, searching for AI models, and executing video generation tasks. Theallowed-toolsconfiguration in the YAML frontmatter limits the agent's capability to this specific tool within the Bash environment, adhering to the principle of least privilege. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection as it interpolates user-supplied text into the
--inputfield of thebeltcommand. - Ingestion points: User-provided strings for the
promptfield in the command examples found inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: Execution of the
beltCLI tool via Bash. - Sanitization: None present; the skill relies on the inference platform's internal content filters to handle adversarial prompts.
Audit Metadata