google-veo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of the belt CLI tool via npx skills add belt-sh/cli and links to documentation hosted on GitHub. These dependencies are necessary for the skill's primary function of interfacing with the inference.sh platform.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the belt command-line utility for authentication, searching for AI models, and executing video generation tasks. The allowed-tools configuration in the YAML frontmatter limits the agent's capability to this specific tool within the Bash environment, adhering to the principle of least privilege.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection as it interpolates user-supplied text into the --input field of the belt command.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided strings for the prompt field in the command examples found in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None present.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of the belt CLI tool via Bash.
  • Sanitization: None present; the skill relies on the inference platform's internal content filters to handle adversarial prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:20 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — google-veo