linkedin-content
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external installation guide and encourages the addition of external skills from the
belt-shandinference-shorganizations to the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
beltCLI tool (authorized viaallowed-tools) to perform tasks such as content research and cross-platform social media posting. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that processes untrusted data from external sources, which could potentially contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Web search results retrieved via the
tavily/search-assistantapp within thebeltCLI (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing search output.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to external platforms via the
x/post-createcommand. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate the content retrieved from search results before using it to generate social media posts.
Audit Metadata