newsletter-curation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses tools like
tavily/search-assistantandexa/searchto ingest content from the public internet for newsletter curation. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in external web pages could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Commands utilizing
belt app run tavily/search-assistantandbelt app run exa/searchin the 'Content Sourcing' section ofSKILL.mdfetch untrusted data into the agent context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions found within the curated search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows access to the
Bashtool (via thebeltCLI), which could be leveraged if the agent is manipulated by injected content. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no guidelines for the agent to filter or escape the content fetched from external sources before using it to generate newsletter sections or social media teasers.
Audit Metadata