newsletter-curation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses tools like tavily/search-assistant and exa/search to ingest content from the public internet for newsletter curation. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in external web pages could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Commands utilizing belt app run tavily/search-assistant and belt app run exa/search in the 'Content Sourcing' section of SKILL.md fetch untrusted data into the agent context.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions found within the curated search results.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows access to the Bash tool (via the belt CLI), which could be leveraged if the agent is manipulated by injected content.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no guidelines for the agent to filter or escape the content fetched from external sources before using it to generate newsletter sections or social media teasers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — newsletter-curation