technical-blog-writing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the installation of external software components from unverified sources, including
npx skills add belt-sh/cliand various skills from theinference-shrepository. These sources are not recognized as trusted vendors and lack version pinning, posing a supply chain risk. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions provide templates for generating and executing arbitrary Python code at runtime via the
infsh/python-executortool. This pattern, used for tasks like generating benchmark charts, allows for the execution of dynamically constructed logic, which can be exploited if the prompt context is manipulated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external search results (
belt app run exa/search) without adequate sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: External content from the
exa/searchtool is incorporated into the agent's context inSKILL.mdto inform technical research. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to treat external data as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within the search results.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities, including filesystem/shell access via
Bash(belt *)and arbitrary Python execution. - Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to filter or sanitize the retrieved technical content before it influences subsequent tool execution or content generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
Bash(belt *)tool to perform network-reliant operations and execute remote applications, expanding the attack surface for command injection if user-supplied input or external data flows into these command templates.
Audit Metadata