agent-tui
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Remote Code Execution]: The skill suggests a one-line installation method for a utility.
- Evidence: The command
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pproenca/agent-tui/master/install.sh | shinSKILL.mddownloads and executes a script from a third-party source without a manual review step. - [External Downloads]: The skill references several external sources for tool installation.
- Evidence: It suggests using
npm,pnpm, andbunto install theagent-tuipackage, as well ascargo installfrom the GitHub repositoryhttps://github.com/pproenca/agent-tui.git. - [Command Execution]: The skill provides instructions for managing system processes and files to facilitate its daemonization logic.
- Evidence: The script snippet in
SKILL.mdusestmux kill-session,agent-tui daemon stop, andrm -f /tmp/agent-tui*to prepare the execution environment. - [Indirect Prompt Injection]: The skill is designed to automate terminal interactions based on visual feedback, which introduces an attack surface where untrusted data could influence behavior.
- Ingestion points: Terminal screen content is captured via
agent-tui screenshot(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters to separate terminal content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform actions via
agent-tui type,agent-tui press, andagent-tui run(referenced inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill does not describe mechanisms to sanitize or validate terminal content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata