stitch::manage-design-system
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides instructions and examples for using a Python script (
upload_to_stitch.py) that accepts an--api-keyparameter. Guiding an AI agent to pass sensitive credentials as command-line arguments is insecure, as these values can be exposed in process listings, logs, or command history. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local Python script located at
stitch-skills/plugins/stitch-design/skills/upload-to-stitch/scripts/upload_to_stitch.pyto handle design system uploads. While this appears to be a vendor-provided tool, it represents a core capability of the skill to execute arbitrary code on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses
read_url_contentandweb_fetchto retrieve project assets (HTML/Metadata) from remote URLs and subsequently uploads processed data to the Stitch platform. While this is part of the design management workflow, it establishes a data flow from external sources to the Stitch API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It retrieves HTML code and project metadata from external URLs (e.g.,
screenshot.downloadUrl,htmlCode.downloadUrl) usingread_url_content. - Ingestion points: External HTML content is fetched via
read_url_contentbased on project metadata. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched HTML code.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, and Stitch-specific tools, allowing it to modify files or execute commands based on instructions it might process. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the fetched HTML content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata