operator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to transmit the "complete, verbatim contents" of local configuration files and project data to the
ask_cloud_operatortool on theautocloudMCP server. Although it contains explicit instructions to redact secrets and avoid credential files, the automated transmission of potentially sensitive project source code to a remote agent constitutes a data exposure risk.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user queries and local file contents (Terraform, YAML) "as-is" and passes them to a secondary agent, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded in analyzed data.\n - Ingestion points: Local configuration files (*.tf, *.yaml, etc.), diffs, error logs, and user queries (SKILL.md).\n
- Boundary markers: External data is delimited using headings containing the file paths (SKILL.md).\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can read local filesystem data, write generated code to the workspace, and invoke the
ask_cloud_operatorMCP tool (SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: Implements a rule to redact passwords, tokens, and keys, and explicitly forbids sending files like
.env,*.tfstate, andkubeconfig(SKILL.md).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizesgcloud config get-value projectas a fallback mechanism to identify the active GCP project context (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata