post-merge-check
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to ingest and act upon data from external, potentially attacker-controlled sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: As specified in SKILL.md, the agent ingests data from pull-request text, issue descriptions, CI logs, deployment output, and live web page content.
- Boundary markers: While the skill includes high-level instructions to treat this data as untrusted and to avoid executing embedded instructions, it does not define technical boundary markers (such as XML tags or specific delimiters) to isolate this external data from the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill authorizes the agent to exercise user flows in browser contexts and inspect system logs, which are significant actions that could be targeted by malicious instructions embedded in the ingested data.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not prescribe specific sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata