champion-tracker
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
champion_tracker.pycontains a_load_dotenvfunction that programmatically searches parent directories (up to 10 levels) for.envfiles and loads their contents into environment variables. This pattern allows for the exposure of sensitive configuration data to the script's execution environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
champion_tracker.pyusesimportlib.utilandexec_moduleto dynamically load and execute logic from a computed file path (../../lead-qualification/scripts/enrich_leads.py). This dynamic execution of external script files bypasses static import analysis and allows runtime code modification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script modifies the system path using
sys.path.insert(0, ...)to include the project root, enabling it to import arbitrary modules from the broader agent environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch LinkedIn profile data from
api.apify.comand a vendor-specific proxy atapi.gooseworks.aiusing therequestslibrary. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes CSV files (
champions.csv) containing data sourced from external reviews and social media. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: Reads champion data from
input/champions.csvand manual imports. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted CSV content from agent instructions during processing.
- Capability inventory: Performs network requests via Apify, writes to the file system (
baseline.json,changes.csv), and reads.envfiles. - Sanitization: Minimal sanitization is performed via regex for name and company normalization, but the script does not validate the content of the CSV fields against malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata